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Are We Overprotecting Code?
Thoughts on First-Generation Internet Law
Orin S. Kerr*
This Essay argues that Internet law presently suffers from a
tendency to regulate cyberspace based on form rather than func-
tion. In areas such as free speech, patent law, and privacy law,
judges and legislatures have regulated Internet code based on what
it is, rather than what it does. The result has been remarkably
broad rules that extend far greater legal protection to code in
cyberspace than its equivalents receive in the physical world. The
author suggests that greater focus on function can permit more
accurate applications of traditional legal doctrines to the Internet.
I. Introduction
The French artist Georges Seurat is famous for his paintings of Parisian
street scenes that consist entirely of thousands of small dots.' If you view a
Seurat painting from just a few inches away, every bit of canvas looks the
same. No matter where you look, you see only colored dots. As you walk
away from the painting, however, objects begin to form. The dots coalesce
into distinct images of people, trees, grass, and sky. At a sufficient distance,
the dots disappear altogether, and where you once saw dots you see instead a
colorful landscape of late nineteenth century Paris.
* Associate Professor, George Washington University Law School, beginning Fall
2001. B.S.E., Princeton University, mS., Stanford University, 3D., Harvard Law School.
Trial Attorney, Computer Crime and Intellectual Property Section, United States Department
of Justice, Washington, D.C. The views expressed in this Essay are mine alone and do not
represent the position of the United States Department of Justice. I wish to thank Erica
Hashimoto, Neal Katyal, Marc Zwillinger, Abigail Phillips, and Sara Maurizi for commenting
on earlier drafts.
1. See generally JOHN RUSSm., SEURAT (1965). Seurat's most famous works are a
series of paintings entitled Un Dimanche d'EtM A L'ile de la Grande Jatte (1884-85) ("A
Sunday in the Summer of the Isle of the Grande Jatte"), which portray wealthy Parisians
strolling in a park along a river.
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, Like a Seurat painting, the Internet has both a "close-up" version and a
very different version at a distance. Close up, the Internet consists of a web
of networked computers that process billions of electronic instructions con-
sisting entirely of digital O's and l's. This perspective is like Seurat's dots:
No matter where you look, every type of communication and instruction is
exactly the same. Everything on the Internet is code, an algorithm, a series of
inputs and outputs.2 Step back, however, and the Internet changes. From a
distance, the 0's and l's of the Internet resolve into the distinct and varied
contents that define our understanding ofthe virtual world of cyberspace. The
0's and l's transform into personal letters, commercial advertisements, hate
speech, pornography, political commentary, shopping excursions, free music,
malicious computer viruses, and everything else you can find online. Like
Seurat's dots, the code fades from view and is replaced by the full picture of
life in cyberspace.
In this Essay, I will argue that Internet law presently suffers from a
tendency to adopt the close-up view of the Internet, and that this tendency has
distorted the application of traditional legal doctrines to computers and the
Internet. In contexts ranging from the First Amendment and privacy law to
patent law, the law of the Internet has regulated code based on its form, not
its function. Like museuragoers eyeing a Seurat painting from inches away,
judges and legislators have viewed Interet code and communications as O's
and l's zipping around the world, without much consideration of what the 0's
and l's are there to do. This failure to appreciate code as a backdrop to the
virtual world of cyberspace has led courts to embrace an Internet formalism
characterized by broad rules that apply equally to all code regardless of its
contents. In short, Internet law tends to regulate code based on what the code
is, rather than the more nuanced conception of what the code does. Whereas
law in the physical world distinguishes carefully between different types of
algorithms, communications, and ideas, the law of cyberspace presently treats
all code equally.
I will also argue in this Essay that the close-up view of the Internet has
had a systematic effect on the nature and scope of Internet law. The adoption
of a close-up perspective has led to the overprotection of code - a tendency
to conclude that statutory and constitutional protections should apply particu-
larly broadly in cyberspace. Our legal system traditionally affords special
protections to certain types of communications and algorithms, protections
2. In this Essay, I use the term "code" to refer broadly to communications and instruc-
tions that networked computers use, follow, and share in the course of their operation. This
definition includes Internet protocols, software programs and algorithms, the contents of
electronic communications among Internet users, and any other type of meaningfill data or data
structure used by networked computers and their users. Cf LAWRENCE LEssiG, CODE AND
OiTnR LAWS OF CYBERSPACE 6 (1999) (using "code" to refer to "the software and hardware that
make cyberspace what it is").
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such as privacy from eavesdropping, First Amendment protections, and
protection as intellectual property. Because Internet law tends to treat all code
equally regardless of its contents, it has expanded the scope of these
protections in cyberspace to include all code. The result has been a dramatic
expansion of the scope of legal protection that code receives in cyberspace as
compared to the physical world of "realspace." Recent decisions indicate a
simple rule: if it's code, the law of cyberspace will protect it. The close-up
view of the Internet has made all code look the same, which has led the courts
to conclude that all code deserves protection.
I will present my argument using three examples. The first example is
the Sixth Circuit's recent First Amendment decision in Junger v. Daley,3
which held that all computer source code is protected speech. My second
example comes from patent law, and examines the Federal Circuit's expansion
of the scope of patent protection for computerized algorithms in State Street
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group.4 The third example studies
the law of electronic surveillance and examines how electronic privacy laws
extend unusually broad privacy protections to unauthorized users of computer
networks. Quite obviously, these three areas of law are very different. In
each case, however, I will argue that the law has overprotected code in the
same way by regulating code based on what it is, rather than what it does. By
adopting a close-up view of computers and the Internet rather than a deeper
functional perspective, judges and legislators have distorted the application
of law to the Internet and granted greater protection to code in cyberspace
than the law extends to analogous code in realspace.
I will leave it to the reader to decide whether the effects of this distortion
are good or bad for the future of the Internet. To the libertarian crowd that
includes most Internet law specialists, the distortions present a mixed bag.
The expansion of free speech in Junger is generally celebrated;' the expansion
of patent protection in State Street is usually condemned.6 My purpose is not
to pass on the substantive merits ofthese decisions, but instead to reveal their
common origins. The examples I discuss in this Essay collectively reflect
first-generation efforts to apply traditional legal doctrines to the Internet. It
is my hope that this Essay can help lead to a greater appreciation of the func-
tional perspective of Internet law, which in turn may lead to a more nuanced
3. 209 F.3d 481,485 (6th Cir. 2000).
4. 149 F.3d 1368, 1372 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
5. See, e.g., Press Release,ACLUIn LegalFirs4 FederalAppeals Court Is Unanimous:
First Amendment Applies to Programming Code, available at www.aclu.org/news/2000/
n040400o.html (last visited on July 20, 2000) (expressing approval for Sixth Circuit's decision
in Junger).
6. See, e.g., James Gleick,PatenttvAbsurd, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Mar. 12,2000, § 6, at 44
(criticizing State Street).
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second generation of Internet law that will more closely match the law of
cyberspace to the law of realspace.'
L The First Amendment
Professor Peter Jungerteaches computer law at the Case Western Univer-
sity Law School in Ohio. In 1997, Junger challenged the Clinton Administra-
tion's regulations on the export of encryption products by attempting to pub-
lish on the World Wide Web the source code of an encryption program he had
authored When the Commerce Department denied Junger's application to
publish the source code without a special license, Junger brought a civil suit
claiming that the denial constituted an infringement of his First Amendment
rights to free speech.9
The first challenge Professor Junger faced in his lawsuit was convincing
the court that his encryption source code was sufficiently expressive to consti-
tite "speech." After all, source code is simplythe text ofa computer program;
the primary purpose of source code is to instruct a computer, not to express
ideas. Professor Junger's case therefore posed a broad threshold question: is
source code speech, such that regulating source code can infringe upon First
Amendment freedoms?' °
The Sixth Circuit answered with a resounding "yes." Writing for a
unanimous panel, Judge Martin concluded that source code is inherently
expressive because it provides a means for computer programmers to commu-
nicate amongst themselves:
[Miuch like a mathematical or scientific formula, one can describe the
function and design ofencryption software with aprose explanation; how-
ever, forindividualsfluentinacomputerprogramminglanguage, [encryp-
7. My argument shares a common thread with Tim Wu's recent essay in the Virginia
Law Review. See generally Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet Analysis, 85 VA. L.
REV. 1163 (1999). In his piece, Wu warns that we should not view the Internet as having a
single essential "nature" because an Internet user's experience varies depending on the particu-
lar application that she uses. Id. at 1163-65. This Essay makes a related but antecedent point:
that when we apply traditional legal doctrines to the Internet, we must first decide whether to
credit the Internet user's experience at all. The close-up perspective on the Internet offers an
external perspective: it sees the Internet as computers processing data, not as a virtual world
of cyberspace. In contrast, the functional perspective accepts the user's internal perspective of
cyberspace and attempts to match the rules of the virtual world of cyberspace with the rules of
realspace. See H.LA. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89-91 (2d ed. 1994) (contrasting internal
and external approaches).
8. See lunger v. Daley, 209 F.3d 481,482-83 (6th Cir. 2000).
9. Id.
10. Importantly, this threshold question does not end the matter. Even if source code is
speech, its regulation may be justified if the regulation is sufficiently tailored to an important
government interest. See Universal City Studios v. Reimerdes, 111 F. Supp. 2d 294, 329-30
(S.D.N.Y. 2000).
1290
THOUGHTS ON FPST-GENERATION INTERNET LA W
tion] source code is the most efficient and precise means by which to
communicate ideas about cryptography.'1
The court concluded that "[b]ecause computer source code is an expressive
means for the exchange of information and ideas about computer program-
ming, we hold that it is protected by the First Amendment. " 2 In other words,
because the First Amendment protects our right to discuss how computer
programs work, it also protects our right to express how those ideas work
through the transmission of actual source code. Ergo, source code equals
speech. Civil liberties groups cheered. 3
But does the court's reasoning make any sense? The breadth of its
holding should raise eyebrows. According to Judge Martin, the "expression"
that source code communicates is information about the source code itself,
and Professor Junger's encryption source code was expressive because it pro-
vided a means of sharing ideas about how to author encryption source code.
But according to this reasoning, every series of computer instructions warrants
First Amendment protection because code will always convey information
about itself. The source code of a program that does X will always be the
author's means of expressing how to write a program that does X, no matter
whatX actually is. For example, the source code ofthe destructive Love Bug
computer virus that infected computers worldwide in May 2000 was the
author's means of expressing how to write a particularly destructive computer
virus. 4 No matter what the source code actually is or does, Junger indicates,
its status as source code automatically entitles the code to First Amendment
protection. No exceptions.
Whatever you think of the political implications of this libertarian ap-
proach, it's not hard to see that it treats cyberspace radically differently from
the physical world. The problem is that everything is "an expressive means for
the exchange of information and ideas" about itsel and this is just as true in
realspace as in cyberspace. For example, imagine that you have designed a
new kind of padlock, and you wish to explain to me how the lock works. The
best way to communicate that set of ideas is to give me one of the locks, let me
play with it, take it apart, and see for myself how it operates. Sure, you could
write a book that offers "a prose explanation" for how the padlock works, but
I will learn much more by examining the lock first-hand. To borrow a phrase
from the Junger court, access to the lock itself provides "the most efficient and
11. Junger, 209 F.3d at484.
12. Id. at 485.
13. See, e.g., Press Release, ACLUIn LegalFirs FederalAppeals CourtIs Unanimous:
First Amendment Applies to Programming Code, available at www.aclu.org/news/2000/
n0404OOc.html (last visited on July 20,2000) (applauding Sixth Circuit's decision in Junger).
14. See Ted Bridis, Virus Gives aLove" a Bad Name, WAIL ST. J., May 5,2000, at B1
(describing impact of Love Bug computer virus).
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precise means by which to communicate ideas" about it. And so it is for
everything else inthe world. Robbing a bank provides the most instructive way
to teach someone how to rob a bank; kicking someone in the shins provides an
excellent way of communicating the concept of kicking someone in the shins.
So long as the only "expression" we are concerned with is information about
the act or thing itself, that act or thing is bound to be an "an expressive means
for the exchange of information and ideas" about it.
But does this mean that you have a First Amendment right to distribute
padlocks, to rob banks, and to kick people in the shins? Of course not. In the
physical world, we recognize that the "expression" that the First Amendment
protects goes beyond what things are to what they say."5 Just look at the
Supreme Court's cases involving expressive conduct. According to the Court,
burning the American flag is protected expression - not because it provides
an efficient means of cmmunicating ideas about how to bum flags, but
because it communicates a political message about the United States.1
6
Similarly, spending money on a political campaign can constitute expressive
speech because it furthers causes that the campaign represents, not because it
gives other people ideas about how to spend money." Neither burning flags
nor giving money to a campaign is speech in a formal sense. However, the
First Amendment protects both acts because they carry the substance of
expression. They actually communicate something. Regulation of source
code presents the converse of these cases. Whereas flag-burning involves
meaningful expression without the form of speech, source code provides the
form of speech without meaningful expression 8
Why did the Sixth Circuit ignore these core principles in Junger and
adopt a remarkably expansive interpretation of the First Amendment in
cyberspace? It did so because the court viewed source code using the close-up
paradigm of what the code looked like, rather than the deeper functional
perspective of what the code was actually supposed to do. Professor Junger's
source code reprinted in an appendix must have appeared to the judges to be
just like a speech in a quasi-foreign language, and it must have seemed natural
to extend the same First Amendment protection to expression in a computer
language that they would extend to expression in a foreign language. In other
words, the court focused onthe form ofthe speech, not its substance. Because
15. See City of Dallas v. Stanglin, 490 U.S. 19,25 (1989) ("It is possible to find some
kernel of expression in almost every activity a person undertakes - for example, walking down
the street or meeting one's friends at a shopping mall - but such a kernel is not sufficient to
bring the activity within the protection of the FirstAmendment.").
16. See Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397,406 (1989).
17. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-59 (1976).
18. Put another -way, the fact that source code looks like speech should no more entitle
source code to protection than the fact that burning a flag does not look like speech should
disqualify flag-burning from protection.
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the nuts-and-bolts of the source code looked like speech, the Junger court
assumed that it was.
But this view hides a key assumption: that the close-up perspective of
computer code offers the most appropriate means of determining how much
protection code deserves as expressive speech. After all, the test for whether
something constitutes protected expression is highly contextual; it depends on
"the factual context and environment in which it was undertaken."19 Walking
down a street on your way to work would not be expressive for First Amend-
ment purposes, but walking down the same street in a parade for civil rights
certainly would be. Asking the abstract question of whether walking consti-
tutes expressive speech looks at the wrong level of generality: the proper
query is, in what particular circumstances is walking expressive? Similarly,
the abstract question of whether source code constitutes expressive speech
asks the wrong question; it fails to look at source code from the deeper per-
spective that would reveal constitutionally meaningful forms of expression. 0
Just as viewing a Seurat painting from inches away reveals only dots, the
Junger court's myopic view of source code revealed only communications
that looked like speech in form, but lacked the deeper significance required
to establish constitutional expression. By viewing code based on what it is
rather than what it is designed to do, the Junger court was led to adopt a
blanket rule that extended far greater protection to code in cyberspace than its
equivalent receives in the physical world.
H. Patent Law
To qualify for patent protection, a new invention must fall within one
of the specific categories that the Patent Act deems patentable subject mat-
19. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405,410 (1974).
20. From this perspective, a useful starting point is to consider how much the First
Amendment protects input delivered to machines. We frequently enter input into machines to
instruct them to do what we want some machines are configured to accept physical inputs
(such as a car, which is driven by pressing and releasing foot pedals and turning a steering
wheel), whereas other machines are configured to accept text inputs (such as a computer, which
is instructed by source code converted to object code). The fortuity of how the machine is
configured should not determine the degree of constitutional protection these inputs receive.
This problem should become clear in several years when machines that today accept only physi-
cal inputs are reconfigured to accept text inputs. For example, it may be possible in the future
to drive a car using speech, rather than through physical inputs such as a steering wheel. A
driver might simply say, "Car, turn left on Pine Street and accelerate to fifty miles per hour."
Should these instructions receive enhanced protection simply because they take the form of
speech? Today, we understand the difference between writing a prose explanation for how to
drive a car at illegal speeds and actually doing so: the former is protected speech, the latter an
unprotected act that can lead to a ticket Decisions such as Junger threaten to collapse this dis-
tinction. If drivers commit speeding offenses by telling their cars to accelerate to illegal speeds,
will speeding laws violate the First Amendment?
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ter.2 The two most common categories, and the ones most relevant to Internet
law, are "machines" and "processes." Most people intuitively understand
machine inventions; Alexander Graham Bell's telephone and Thomas Edi-
son's lightbulb provide classic examples. Patents for processes are no less
important, however, because relatively few inventions take their full form in
a tangible machine. For example, an inventor can obtain a process patent for
a new way of refining oil, a new way of manufacturing industrial diamonds,
or a new way of recycling plastics. These inventions discover new ways ofmanipulating preexisting materials to create new materials, or to create old
materials in new ways. Patent law recognizes the importance of these inven-
tions by extending patent protection beyond mere machines to cover processes
as well. So long as the process satisfies the Patent Act's remaining standards
of patentability, such as novelty, nonobviousness, and utility, then the process
may be patented. After the process or machine is patented, the owner of the
patent has a right to exclude others from making or using the invention for
twenty years. z
The Patent Act's limitations on patentable subject matter prompt an
obvious question in the Internet age: Can a computer program be patentable
subject matter, and ff so, when? The Federal Circuit offered its answer to this
question inthe landmark decision of State StreetBank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group.' State Street involved a patent on a computer programthat
performed various specialized accounting functions. The program calculated
incremental additions and subtractions to numbers that represented money held
in pooled mutual funds and then outputted net gains, a final share price, and
various other financial information that could be relied upon by financial
analysts and regulators. Valuable stuff, the costly litigation suggests, but was
it patentable? The Federal Circuit concluded that it was. A computer running
a program is a "machine," the court reasoned, and it might even be a "machine"
that executes a "process."24 Further, it was a machine that produced "a useful,
concrete, and tangible result," namely the output of the program, which in the
21. The invention must be "[a] process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter,
or... improvementthereof." 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1994).
22. See 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1994) (providing that patent term begins on "[the] date on
which the patent issues and ending 20 years from the date on which the application for the
patent was filed in the United States").
23. See State St Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Group, 149 F3d 1368, 1372 (Fed.
Cir. 1998).
24. Id. at 1372. Oddly, the State Street court seemed unconcerned with whether the
invention at issue was a machine, or instead a process. After noting that the patent itself claimed
that the invention was a machine, the Court refused to scrutinize the claim, stating simply that
"for the purpose of a § 101 analysis, it is of little relevance whether [the claim] is directed to a
'machine' or a 'process,' as long as it falls within at least one of the four enumerated categories
ofpatentable subject matter, 'machine' and 'process' being such categories." IM
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case ofthe State Street program was the final share price ofthe pooled fumds.
Therefore, the computer program fell within the scope of patentable subject
matter.
State Street teaches that every computer program is a "machine" that
executes a "process," no matter what the program is or does. So long as the
program creates an output, which essentially all programs do, it produces "a
useful, concrete, and tangible result" and may be patented. No exceptions.
This sounds a lot like Junger, doesn't it? Just as the Sixth Circuit in Junger
indicated that all code is protected speech, the Federal Circuit in State Street
indicated that all code is patentable subject matter. Just as code's status as
code made it speech in Junger, code's status as code made it fall within the
scope of patentable subject matter in State Street. Internet companies rushed
to apply for patent protection.
26
But does the result in State Street make any sense? Its holding certainly
represents a dramatic expansion of the scope of patentability beyond what
inventors have grown used to in the physical world. Before State Street, it
was a fundamental axiom of patent law that any patentable invention had to
rest on some interaction with realspace, with the natural world of physics,
chemistry, and biologyY What distinguished patentable inventions from
merely interesting ideas was that the former announced a new way that the
natural world of realspace could be manipulated to reach a practical result.
For example, you could patent a new design for a toothbrush; the toothbrush
harnessed the laws of physics to manipulate the physical world and clean your
teeth. On the other hand, you couldn't patent the idea of brushing your teeth;
the idea was simply a conceptual advance that did not depend on any interac-
tion with the physical world.
The rule announced in State Street flips that axiom on its head. Under
State Street, an idea programmed as code and run on a computer ceases to be
an idea and instead becomes a patentable "process" run on a "machine." The
result is a strange dichotomy between "processes" run on the "machine" of a
computer (which are patentable) and the "processes" run on the "machine" of
the human brain (which are not). Take the accounting program patent at issue
in State Street. The patent teaches a method, an algorithm for making a series
of calculations. In theory, a very patient person could perform that series of
calculations in his head, the laws of physics, chemistry, or biology need not
25. See id. at 1373 (quotingln reAlappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1544 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
26. See, e.g., Raymond Van Dyke, Software Patents Offer Opportunities and Obstacles:
'State Street' Sparked a Boom in PTO and Court Filings, and the Dust Has Not Quite Settled,
NAT'L L.., May 24, 1999, at C19 ("As the aftershock of State Street subsides, the avalanche
of new software patent issuances and litigation begins.").
27. See Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 66 (1972) (stating that inventions based on
discovered law of nature must apply law of nature to new and useful end to be patentable).
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apply. But if we found such a John Doe and taught him how to do the calcula-
tions, could we patent the method? Could we argue that John's brain is a
patentable "machine" that executes a "process" and that we should have a
right to enjoin anyone else from performing those calculations without paying
us royalties? Of course not. You can't patent mere ideas. But switch the
central processing unit from a human neural network to a silicon wafer and
voila!, it's patentable."
What explains the Federal Circuit's overprotection of code in State
Street? The key is the court's embrace of a close-up perspective of computers
and the virtual world of cyberspace. The State Street court envisioned com-
puters as machines that process streams of instructions to create an output.
From this perspective, it seems at least plausible to extend the reach of the
patent laws broadly throughout the networked computers of cyberspace; after
all, "machines" and "processes" are two categories of patentable subject
matter. However, viewing cyberspace as just machines and processes is like
viewing a Seurat painting as just dots; it misses the purpose of the entire
enterprise. This close-up perspective ignores the virtual world of cyberspace
that computers create, in which code defines every aspect of life ranging from
trips to the store, the movies, and town square, to interactions in the bedroom
and in politics.
From this deeper perspective, awarding patents to computer programs
simply because they run on "machines" means that almost every aspect of life
in cyberspace can be patentable subject matter. The result is that the patent
laws can cover far more in cyberspace than they can in realspace. If someone
devises a new way to shop for books, to conduct an auction, or to travel
between different sites on the Internet, he can now obtain a patent that pre-
vents the hundreds of millions of other users of the Internet from doing the
same unless they pay him royalties.29 Such restrictions on everyday life would
be unimaginable in realspace, but State Street has made them routine in
cyberspace. Instead of carving out the same sphere of unpatentable public
domain that exists in realspace for cyberspace, the State Street court embraced
a close-up view of computers and the Internet that led to a broad rule that
extends far greater patent protection to eyberspace.
28. Cf JohnR. Thomas, The Patentingof theLiberal Professions,40 B.C. L. REV. 1139,
1160 (1999) ("After State Street, it is hardly an exaggeration to say that if you can name it, you
can claim it").
29. A famous example of such a patent is Amazon.com's one-click shopping patent. See
Amazon.com, Inc. v. Bamesandnoble.com, Inc., 73 F. Supp. 2d 1228, 1232 (W.D. Wash. 1999)
(enjoining defendant from using Amazon's patented "one click" method of placing product
orders over Internet).
1296
THOUGHTS ON FRST-GENERATION INTERNET LA W
1I. Electronic Privacy
The law of electronic privacy provides the third example of how Intemet
law overprotects code. The problem here is a statutory scheme, not a judicial
decision. However, the analytical framework echoes the Sixth Circuit's
approach to the First Amendment in Junger and the Federal Circuit's ap-
proach to patent protection in State Street. Once again, we find law that
extends protection to code based onthe nuts and bolts of what it is, rather than
the broader picture of what it does.
To understand how privacy law can overprotect code in cyberspace, it
helps first to understand the difference between the legal regimes that protect
privacy against government monitoring in realspace and in cyberspace. In
realspace, the primary source of protection against government monitoring is
the Fourth Amendment.30 The Fourth Amendment protects citizens from
warrantless governmental invasions of their "reasonable" or "legitimate"
expectations ofprivacy. This is anotoriously fact-sensitive standard; it permits
the government to invade subjective expectations of privacy in some cases, but
not others.31 For example, government agents can watch us walk down a public
street, but cannot break into our house to watch us sleep in our bed at night.
Whether the government can watch you without a warrant depends on the
context of where you are, of who you are, and of what you are doing.
Not so in cyberspace. In cyberspace, the primary source of protection
against government monitoring is the federal statute known as the Wiretap
Act, or "Title 1HI.'2 Title Ell is considerably broader than the Fourth Amend-
ment; it confers privacy rights on all parties to "electronic communications"
regardless of what the communications happen to be or what message they
contain. Because nearly every communication sent over the Internet is an
"electronic communication,"" the result is a strikingly broad privacy scheme
that prohibits real-time interception of essentially all Internet communications.
Some exceptions do exist, of course. The government may intercept commu-
nications if a party to the communication consents,' and a network system
administrator can intercept communications when it is a "necessary incident"
to the protection of the network." However, none of the exceptions to Title
30. U.S. CoNsT. amend. IV.
31. See O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709,715 (1987).
32. 18 U.S.C. § 2510-22 (1994).
33. 18U.S.C.§2510(12)(1994). Some Internet communications carrythe human voice;
these communications are "wire communications" pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1). Like
electronic communications, wire communications receive the same statutory protection regard-
less of their contents.
34. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2Xc) (1994).
35. See 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2XaXi) (1994).
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III take into account the nature or contents ofthe communications themselves.
Instead, the status of the communication qua communication triggers the
statutory protection against interception.
The failure of Title El to distinguish between different types of Internet
communications creates bizarre results in practice. Consider the privacy
rights of computer hackers who commit electronic trespasses onto the private
networks of others. A hacker who breaks into a computer network should
have no reasonable expectation of privacy in his activity within the victim
network; like any other trespasser, he cannot object on constitutional grounds
if the police watch as he commits his crime." The statutory privacy protec-
tion of Title I draws no such nuanced distinction, however. Title Il extends
the same privacy protection to a computer hacker trying to take down a
network as it does to an authorized user writing a personal note to his
mother?7 As a result, the statute gives hackers a privacy right in their attacks;
unless an exception to the statute applies, Title Ill prohibits private parties or
the government from even watching the crime occur. It is worth savoring the
irony here. By failing to distinguish between authorized and unauthorized
communications, Title III extends privacy protections to criminal efforts to
invade the privacy of others. The computer hacker's undeserved statutory
privacy right trumps the legitimate privacy rights of the hacker's victims.
38
36. See United States v. Seidlitz, 589 F.2d 152, 160 (4th Cir. 1978) (suggesting that
computer hacker has no reasonable expectation of privacy inside victim network); see also
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,143 n.12 (1978) (noting that burglar "plying his trade" does not
have reasonable expectation of privacy in victim's house during commission of burglary);
Amezquita v. Colon, 518 F.2d 8, 11 (1st Cir. 1975) (holding that trespassers cannot establish
reasonable expectation of privacy on government land).
37. This effect is ameliorated somewhat by the fact that unauthorized users probably do
not have standing to move for suppression of illegally intercepted communications because no
actual privacy interests were invaded. See Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 139 (1978)
(suggesting that standing to move for suppression under Title IH mirrors standing under Fourth
Amendment); United States v. Baranek, 903 F.2d 1068,1072 (6th Cir. 1990) (same); Seidlitz,
589 F.2d at 160 (expressing "serious doubts" as to whether computer hackers have standing to
move for suppression of illegally intercepted communications). Of course, this distinction itself
has little meaning given that Title I presently does not contain a suppression remedy for the
unauthorized interception of intercepted electronic (as opposed to oral or wire) communica-
tions; instead, the primary remedy is civil damages. See Steve Jackson Games, Inc. v. United
States Secret Serv., 36 F.3d 457,461 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994).
38. The remarkable results that this scheme produces are illustrated by a recent case
involving a "cloned" cellular phone, which is a cell phone illegally programmed with the stolen
access numbers of a legitimate phone to provide the owner of the cloned phone with free
cellular service. InMcClellandv. McGrath, 31 F. Supp. 2d 616 (ND. 111. 998), police officers
investigating a kidnaping traced the kidnaper's telephone calls to a cloned cellular phone. Eager
to learn more about the kidnaper's identity and location, the police asked the cellular provider
to intercept the kidnaper's communications and relay any information to the officers that might
permit them to find the kidnaper and save his victim. The provider complied, and the provider's
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How did we arrive at such a strange result? Here, a page of history is
worth a volume of logic. Congress enacted Title EIl in 1968 following two
Supreme Court decisions interpreting the Fourth Amendment: Berger v. New
York, 9 which announced Fourth Amendment limits on wiretapping phone
lines, 40 and Katz v. United States, 41 which found Fourth Amendment problems
in the use of electronic listening devices commonly known as "bugs."'42 As
passed in 1968, Title Ill prohibited the use of devices to intercept two types
of communications: "oral communications,"'4 3 which were defined as conver-
sations that supported a reasonable expectation of privacy (thus prohibiting
the use of privacy-invading bugs in response to Katz), and "wire commuica-
tions,"'4 which were conversations carried by wire (thus prohibiting telephone
wiretapping in response to Berger). Notably, the definition of "wire commu-
nications" did not include the requirement that the communications support
a reasonable expectation of privacy. This would have been superfluous; in
1968, all wire communications were human-to-human telephone conversations
that seemed intrinsically private.45
When Congress amended Title III in 1986 and added a third category of
communications to the statute to include Internet communications, it chose to
model the new third category, "electronic communications," on the structure
of the second category, "wire communications.""' This was a reasonable
judgment at the time; it made sense to protect data in the same way that the
statute protected voice.' As a result, the definition of"electronic communica-
tions" did not incorporate any requirement that the communication should be
information led the police to the kidnaper. After being caught, the kidnaper brought a civil suit
against the police alleging that their actions directing the provider to intercept his unauthorized
calls violated his statutory privacy rights. The district court agreed. Id. at 619.
39. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
40. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41, 62-63 (1967).
41. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
42. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,359 (1967).
43. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(2) (1994).
44. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1994).
45. In fact, the legislative history of Title I indicates that Congress was attempting to
track the Fourth Amendment when it extended privacy protections to all parties to telephone
conversations, regardless of the contents of those communications. See S. REP. No. 90-1097,
at 96 (1968).
46. See HRL REP. No. 99-647, at 34-35 (1986) (explaining source of definition for
"electronic communication"). Compare 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1994) (defining electronic com-
munications) with 18 U.S.C. § 2510(1) (1994) (defining wire communications).
47. Interestingly, Title M does not treat data and voice entirely equally. For example, the
unauthorized interception of data does not trigger a suppression remedy, whereas interception
of voice does result in suppression. See 18 U.S.C. § 2518(1OXa) (1994); Steve Jackson Games,
Inc. v. United States Secret Sere., 36 F.3d 457,461 n.6 (5th Cir. 1994).
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able to support a reasonable expectation of privacy. Every electronic transfer
of data, "of any nature," constituted a protected electronic communication.
Whether protecting all Internet communications equally made sense in
1986, it certainly makes no sense today. Today we realize that Internet com-
munications mirror the extraordinarily rich and diverse offerings of cyber-.
space. If you were to select a random spot on the Internet and watch the
Internet traffic streaming by, you would pick up e-mails, Web pages in transit,
commands sent to remote servers, picture or music files, network support
traffic, and almost everything else in cyberspace. Many ofthese communica-
tions would deserve privacy, but others would not. Much like human behavior
in realspace, electronic behavior in cyberspace is too varied to fit within a
single paradigm. One-size-fits-all doesn't work."
Title I's regime for protecting Internet communications from intercep-
tion thus suffers from the same problem that the Sixth Circuit encountered in
Junger and the Federal Circuit encountered in State Street. By adopting a
myopic view of the Internet that focuses on the nuts-and-bolts of what it is
rather than on the virtual world that the Internet creates, Title III paints with
a brush so broad that it encompasses all code. Every bit and byte qualifies.
The close-up perspective reveals only dots, and fails to recognize the impor-
tant distinctions among the different kinds of communications in cyberspace.
IV Conclusion
The purpose of this Essay has been to critique a way of thinking about
Internet regulation. I have focused on judicial decisions and a statutory
scheme that regulate Internet code without considering its contents, and have
suggested that this nuts-and-bolts, close-up approach to the Internet lacks
nuance and tends to overprotect code compared to its equivalents in the
physical world. By making this argument, however, I am not suggesting that
the close-up view of the Internet will never provide an effective way of
regulating cyberspace. Both law and cyberspace are too diverse for a single
perspective to work every time. However, I am suggesting that the close-up
view of the Internet will often prove inadequate. Most legal doctrines draw
distinctions based on function, not form, and we should strive to maintain
these distinctions when applying traditional legal doctrines to the new world
of the Internet. The deeper perspective of cyberspace that focuses on function
rather than form will usually provide the best way of translating our doctrines
and our values from the physical world to a virtual one.
48. 18 U.S.C. § 2510(12) (1994).
49. See Wu, supra note 7, at 1163 ("A singular model of Internet usage has become too
small to capture the dramatic diversity of today's Internet").
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